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ABSTRACT
Although the post-crisis politicisation of the ECB is widely acknowledged, little
empirical evidence exists about how this important non-majoritarian
institution has responded to public contestation. This article starts filling this
gap by investigating whether and how public opinion affects ECB
communication. Based on automated text analysis of the speeches delivered
by Executive Board members (2001–2017), the article shows that negative
public opinion is associated with an expansion of the scope of ECB
communication and a reduction in the salience attributed to monetary policy
issues. These results challenge the view according to which the ECB conceives
of its sources of legitimation based almost exclusive on the achievement of its
mandate. In particular, our findings suggest that increased politicisation leads
the ECB to reassess the sources of its legitimation strategy from a strategy
based on output achievement towards one based on participation to broader
policy debates.
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Introduction
On the heels of the sovereign debt crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has
been widely credited for its pivotal role in helping the Eurozone navigate the
worst crisis since its creation. Through the adoption of unconventional pol-
icies, the ECB has contributed to disperse risks in the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) (Schelkle, 2017), limit the potential for mass unrest in the
member states (Genovese, Schneider, & Wassmann, 2016) and display the lea-
dership (Verdun, 2017) and independence (Lombardi & Moschella, 2016) that
ultimately preserved the same existence of the single currency. However, the
crisis has also spurred a large public contestation of the ECB and its role: public
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trust towards the ECB has sagged (Roth, Gros, & Nowak-Lehmann, 2014) and
an unusual string of mass protests has brought to the surface widespread
dissent towards the ECB and its policies.1
While several studies have investigated the causes of public discontent
towards the ECB (Braun, 2016; Jones, 2009; Högenauer & Howarth, 2016),
the purpose of this paper is to systematically investigate whether the ECB
has responded to the politicisation of its role and to help illuminate on the
legitimation strategies of this important non-majoritarian institution. Indeed,
there is abundant evidence indicating that the ECB has not been impermeable
to the criticisms, especially in the area of communication. For instance, in a
notable shift for an institution that has been traditionally wary of disclosing
too much information to the public (see Issing, 1999), the ECB moved in
this direction by starting publishing accounts of its internal deliberations in
January 2015. The ECB also started the practice of appearing before a
number of national parliaments (Tesche, 2018), increased the frequency of
communication with the European Parliament (Fraccaroli, Giovannini, &
Jamet, 2018), engaged with debates on fiscal policy and structural adjustment
(Ban & Patenaude, 2018; Diessner & Lisi, 2019); and even toured Europe in
order ‘to engage, explain and listen’ to European public2
A straightforward explanation for the changes to the ECB traditionally
guarded communication strategy lies in the (de facto and de jure) transform-
ations in the ECB role throughout the crisis. As the ECB took on an increased pol-
itical leadership by adopting unconventional policies and taking on new legal
responsibilities in the realm of financial stability, its rhetoric expanded accord-
ingly (Diessner & Lisi, 2019; Ferrara, 2019; Tortola & Pansardi, 2019). Although
the changes in the policy context are certainly important to explain the ECB
behavior, we argue that the ECB strategically responds to negative public
opinion by using an expanded communication as a way to increase its per-
ceived legitimacy. Expanding communication is instrumental to achieve this
goal for two reasons. First, an expanded communication allows recasting the
ECB public image so as to reject the accusation of being an institution obsessed
with the achievement of price stability only. Second, an expanded communi-
cation allows the ECB to enhance its legitimation by addressing the policy con-
cerns of several national publics simultaneously rather than focussing on a
limited number of concerns that might be salient in some countries only.
Empirically, we investigate the impact of public opinion on the ECB com-
municative strategies by analysing the speeches delivered by the members
of the Executive Board from 2001 to 2017. Specifically, we apply quantitative
text analysis to identify how ECB policymakers share their attention among
monetary and non-monetary policy issues in their communication with the
public. The advantage of measuring the impact of public opinion on the sal-
ience attributed to issues that do not directly fall in the remit of the ECB price
stability mandate is that it allows assessing what the ECB prioritises in its
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policy message and thus to appreciate whether the ECB deviates from past
practice of focussing its rhetoric on its mandate as the way to achieve
(output) legitimacy.
Our findings suggest that the ECB reacts to negative public opinion by allo-
cating its attention to a wider set of issues rather than concentrating on those
associated to its core mandate. This result challenges the view according to
which the ECB conceives of its sources of legitimation based almost exclusive
on the achievement of its mandate. In particular, our findings suggest that
increased politicisation leads the ECB to reassess the sources of its legitima-
tion strategy from a strategy based on output achievement towards one
based on participation to broader policy debates.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical argu-
ments that informs our analysis. Section 3 details the research design used to
gauge the impact of public opinion on ECB communication. Section 4 pre-
sents the results. Section 5 discusses the findings, their limitations and impli-
cations for future research.
Speaking (more) to the public: why and how
Central banks’ communication is usually analyzed to gauge the effectiveness of
monetary policy to achieve its goals of price stability and output stabilisation.
Given the central role that financial markets play in the transmission of the
monetary policy impulse, scholarship has overwhelmingly focused on central
banks’ communication with financial markets (Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher,
De Haan, & Jansen, 2008). Recently, however, increasing attention has been
devoted to exploring how central banks’ communication affects public expec-
tations, including households and societal groups’ expectations (Haldane &
McMahon, 2018). This attention stems from the recognition that communi-
cation with the general public is ‘at least as important’ as communication
with financial markets (Blinder et al., 2008, p. 941) also because, ultimately,
the evolution of inflation is shaped by public’s inflation expectations,
through wage claims and savings, investment and consumption decisions.
In spite of the increased attention to communication with the public, exist-
ing literature has mainly focused on how central banks’ messages impact on
the behavior of societal actors. In contrast, studies that investigate the impact
of public attitudes on central banks’ communicative behavior are still sparse.
Yet, the relationship with the public is crucial not only for the effectiveness
of monetary policy but also for the independence of central banks That is to
say, like other non-majoritarian institutions, central banks care not only about
effective policy solutions but also bureaucratic survival (Reh, Bressanelli, &
Koop, 2020; Moschella & Pinto, 2019). Indeed, central banks’ statutes are
subject to legislators’ interventions – unless the latter face a political cost
for doing so. Indeed, several studies show that central bank independence
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is endogenous to the political system (Keefer & Stasavage, 2003) and that
independence is more likely to be preserved if policymakers face high audi-
ence costs for interfering with the central bank’s structure and legal status
(Lohmann, 2003).
Although the prospect of legislators’ interventions is higher for most
central banks than it is for the ECB, whose independence is enshrined in an
international treaty and not in domestic legislation, ‘[t]he ECB cannot ignore
the possibility of an unfavourable political reaction’ too (Jones, 2009,
p. 1093). Negative public opinion can indeed weaken elected policymakers’
support for central bank independence thus jeopardising the key feature of
non-majoritarian institutions (also Blauberger and Martinsen 2020). This risk
is all the more concrete because, by design, the ECB insulation from politics
‘make[s] it difficult for the ECB to attract political stakeholders who have the
ability and incentives to protect the integrity of the institution when it
comes under political attack’ (Lohmann, 1999, p. 17). Furthermore, the ECB
cannot simply shrug off negative public opinion because it is formally accoun-
table to the European Parliament as the representation of all EU citizens
(Article 284 (3) TFEU).
The challenges that the ECB confronts should public support falters
thereby suggest that the ECB is likely to strategically respond to negative
public opinion. In particular, we argue that the ECB attempts to increase the
degree of perceived legitimation and win back public support by expanding
the scope of its communication beyond issues related to its core mandate.3
To understand why an expanded communication can be regarded as a
legitimation strategy, it is important to take into consideration the character-
istics of the ECB ‘traditional’ communication and the public audiences the ECB
speaks to.
To start with the characteristics of the ECB traditional communication
output, since its creation, the ECB has taken great care in molding a very
guarded communication strategy aimed at limiting the amount of infor-
mation disclosed on internal policy views and decision-making process.4
Such cautiousness was a reflection of the view according to which ECB
accountability lies primarily on the achievement of its mandate rather than
on the amount of information provided to the public (Issing, 1999). The ECB
has consistently justified its approach based on two arguments, both of
which can be traced back to a conception of legitimacy as output legitimacy
(Jabko, 2003; Schmidt, 2016). The first is that too much communication may
confuse the European public about the central bank’s policy intentions and
decisions, thus undermining the central banks’ ability to shape public expec-
tations and achieve its mandated goal. The second argument against an
expanded communication is that this practice could expose ECB policymakers
to undue political pressures. The reasoning here is that the policy views
expressed by ECB officials could be misread in national capitals leading
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domestic policymakers to exercise pressures on ECB policy choices. Because
of the alleged risks deriving from an expanded communication output, ECB
communication has thus been tailored in a way to limit the amount of infor-
mation disclosed to the public, including by reducing information on the
differences in the policy views among ECB policymakers (Blinder et al.,
2008, p. 923). These features in EU communication have also contributed
fueling the accusation that the ECB eschews democratic accountability
(Buiter, 1999) and that, often, the ECB has been reluctant to engage in
public dialogue on broader issues that affect the general public (Transparency
International, 2017).
By ditching its guarded communication approach in favor of an expanded
communication, the ECB can thereby respond to the critics by signaling to
the public that it is an institution not only interested in price stability but also
attentive to a large set of policy debates. For instance, increasing the amount
of information and communication capacity with the public is one of the strat-
egies that international organisations (IOs) systematically pursue to respond to
the politicisation of their role and thus (re)legitimize their activity especially
after major scandals and public protests (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018; Gronau &
Schmidtke, 2016). Similarly to what has been found in the realm of IOs, the
ECB can rely on an expanded communication to legitimize its role and decisions
before external audiences by recasting the central bank’s public image away
from the criticisms of the past. Furthermore, an expanded communication
helps the ECB to manage its public image by allowing it to set out its views
on multiple policy issues and, possibly, shape policy debates around them.
The expansion in communication can also be conceived as a legitimation
strategy in light of the characteristics of the public audiences the ECB
speaks to. As a supranational central bank of 19 countries, the ECB finds
itself in the unique position of having to communicate its decisions to audi-
ences based in different countries with potentially different conceptions of
legitimacy. Indeed, studies on public opinion show that, in spite of growing
Europeanisation, the concerns of EU public are fragmented along national
lines: what is salient issue in one country is not necessarily the most salient
issue in another (Serricchio, Tstakatika, & Quaglia, 2013). By expanding its
communication, the ECB can thereby enhance its perceived legitimacy by
showing to be attentive to the multiple concerns that run throughout
Europe rather than to some of them, as it would be the case if the ECB
sticks to a rhetoric on monetary policy only. This strategy is similar to the
one that international courts have been found to follow in the use case law
citations in their rulings: as international courts tend to maximise their legiti-
macy by avoiding fragmentation in their case law along lines of legal culture
or country-specific factors (Lupu & Voeten, 2012, p. 413), so the ECB can maxi-
mise its legitimacy by avoiding fragmentation in the attention allocated to
policy issues along country lines.
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In short, variation in the scope of communication is indicative of how the
ECB reacts to public signals. An expanded communication provides the ECB
with more opportunities to increase its perceived legitimacy across different
national audiences because the central bank can so address multiple concerns
on a wider range of issues. It also helps the central bank to improve its public
image, allowing it to participate and possibly orient multiple policy and
societal debates. Hence, we expect the ECB to respond to negative public
opinion by expanding its communication because this strategy helps the
central bank legitimize its role and decisions to public audiences.
Data and methods
Dependent variable
To determine whether the ECB responds to the politicisation of its role by
expanding its communication, we develop two interrelated dependent vari-
ables using communication output of the six members of the Executive
Board. The first − issue diversity − captures the distribution of ECB policy-
makers’ attention across the issues covered in their speeches. The second −
core salience − tracks the salience attributed to monetary policy issues as com-
pared to the other issues that appear in central bankers’ speeches: the more
the ECB communication is concentrated on the core mandate, the lower is
issue diversity and vice-versa.
Specifically, we collected all the speeches delivered between 2001 and
2017 by the president of the ECB, the vice president, and the other four
members of the Executive Board.5 Our database consists of 1,427 speeches
issued by 17 different speakers (see Appendix B).6 Although the speeches
do not exhaust the list of channels through which the ECB provides infor-
mation on its activities,7 these documents present a number of empirical
advantages for the purposes of the analysis. To start with, the speeches
here collected are directed at multiple audiences, allowing us to control for
the impact they exert on communication outputs. Furthermore, speeches
are strategically delivered, meaning that monetary policymakers generally
choose what audiences to address and what to say.8
In order to develop our dependent variables, we first applied unsupervised
topic modeling techniques to identify the topics in ECB policymakers’ com-
munication; second, we computed an index gauging issue diversity and
core salience.
Topic modeling: We used structural topic models (STM) to identify topics.
STM allows estimating general semantic themes within a corpus of docu-
ments and to simultaneously analysing the prevalence of each topic con-
ditional on a number of factors.9 Using STM we can, therefore, estimate the
main topics that characterise our corpus of texts as well as the variation of
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their prevalence over time or as a consequence of the impact of major politi-
cal and economic events.
Figure 1 reports the 20 topics extrapolated by the STM following standard
tests aimed at assessing the validity of the topic model (see Appendix C).
Figure 1 also reports the words that are both frequent in and exclusive to a
topic. Frequent words, such as ‘European’, ‘euro’, ‘central’, ‘bank’, are
common across many topics; however, they are characterised by lower
levels of exclusivity – the opposite applies to infrequent words. The most
informative words are therefore those that balance exclusivity and frequency
(Roberts et al., 2014): these words appear with a bigger font in Figure 1.
Based on the results of the topic model, we interpreted the content of each
topic in order to identify the substantive issues policymakers attend to in their
communication. We grouped the 20 topics according to whether they pertain
to one of the following broad issues: EU integration process, financial stability,
fiscal policy, global economic issues, monetary policy, statistics, and structural
reforms.10 These issues capture the main areas of operation of the ECB as well
as its role in the functioning of the EMU. In order to validate topic interpret-
ation, we examined the most frequent and exclusive words that characterise
each topic as well as the most exemplar documents, e.g., the speeches that
Figure 1. Topics in executive board members’ speeches, 2001–2017. Notes: Frequency
indicates the probability of observing each word in the vocabulary of a given topic. Exclu-
sivity identifies words associated with a topic that are unlikely to appear among the top
words of another topic. Words’ labels are weighted by joint frequency and exclusivity.
Words are presented in their stemmed form.
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have the highest proportion of words associated with each topic. To further
validate our interpretation, we plotted the variation in topic prevalence
over time, together with the average value of the expected topic proportion
for each topic in the entire corpus (Figure 2).
Figure 2 thus shows the variety of issues that appear on ECB policy-makers
communication based on our interpretation and validation techniques. Since
our analysis is meant to distinguish ECB communication at large from com-
munication focussed on monetary policy issues, here we provide more infor-
mation on the topics that we classified as monetary policy topics, namely
Topic 2, 6, 13, 17 and 18 (detailed information on the other topics is provided
in Appendix C). The most discussed monetary issue in our corpus is topic 13,
which is also the most discussed topic in the entire corpus. This topic captures
talk on the ECB mandate. Indeed, the most frequent and exclusive words
includes terms such as ‘area’, ‘euro’, ‘price’, ‘rate’, ‘medium’ and ‘HICP’ (i.e., Har-
monised Index of Consumer Prices). These terms clearly reflect the ECB formal
responsibility to achieve price stability over the medium term and set an inter-
est rate for the euro area as a whole. Topic 13 is also associated to Topic
6. Indeed, Topic 6 identifies the monetary policy strategy that the ECB
follows to achieve its price stability objective, as attested by words such as
‘strategi*,’ ‘stabil*,’ ‘price’, ‘mediumterm’, and ‘pillar’ – the latter is an explicit
Figure 2. Topic prevalence over time in executive board members’ speeches, 2001–2017.
Notes: Topics are ordered based on their average prevalence. Red horizontal lines refer to
the average topic prevalence over the period of analysis (2001–2017). 95 percent confi-
dence intervals are reported.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 407
reference to the two-pillar strategy that informs ECB monetary activity. Topic 2
identifies the working of the ECB monetary committee being characterised by
words such as ‘Eurosystem’, ‘bank’, ‘central’, ‘European’, ‘work’ and ‘Frankfurt’,
where the ECB policymakers collectively take decisions. Finally, Topic 17 and
18 identifies the ECB monetary policy tools. Topic 17 refers to conventional,
interest rates tools, including terms such as ‘polici*’, ‘monetary’, ‘price’,
‘inflat*’, ‘bank’ and ‘rate’. Topic 18 instead refers to unconventional tools
being characterised by words such as ‘measur*’, ‘purchas*’, ‘guidanc*’, ‘reco-
veri*’, ‘unconvent*’, ‘accommod*’, ‘negat*’, ‘zero’. All these words refer to
the set of unconventional policies adopted by the ECB as interets rates
approaches the zero lower bound, including asset purchases, forward gui-
dance and even negative interest rates. The validity of interpretation of
topic 18 as capturing talk on unconventional monetary policies is also sup-
ported by the prevalence pattern of this topic over time: the prevalence of
this topic in the speech corpus intensifies following the sovereign debt
crisis and the anaemic recovery in the Eurozone.
Issues diversity and Core salience: To compute our two dependent variables,
we build on the STM’s assumption according to which each speech can be
represented as a mixture of a series of topics that always add up to one.
This assumption implies that more attention on one topic in a speech necess-
arily reduces the attention on other topics (Roberts et al., 2014).
To develop the measure of issue diversity, we retrieve the proportions of all
the topics identified by our analysis and use Shannon’s H entropy index to
estimate the distribution of topics in a speech (Greene, 2016).11 We then trans-
form Shannon’s H into a measure of issue diversity according to the following
formulas, where ui is the prevalence of each topic in a given document (i.e.,
the proportion of words devoted about each topic in the speeches):




Issue Diversity = exp(Shannon′s H)
Issue diversity can vary between 1, when the entire speech is devoted to
only one topic, and 20, when all topics receive the same amount of attention.
Higher values thus mean that Executive Board members distribute their atten-
tion across a greater number of different issues, whereas lower values indicate
that they focus on a smaller set of topics. Among our speeches, issue diversity
varies between 1.07 and 12.11, with a mean of 4.83 (see Appendix D for a plot
of issue diversity as a function of time).
In order to measure core salience, we estimate the proportion of text
belonging to the topics classified under the Monetary policy category for
each document. The assumption here is that the higher the proportion of
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text dedicated to the monetary policy issues, the higher the salience attribu-
ted to these issues. On average, about 33 per cent of our corpus is devoted to
the discussion of topics associated with theMonetary policy category, which is
therefore the most prevalent one in ECB members’ speeches (followed by the
one related to Financial stability). The variable varies from 0.1, meaning that
only very few words are devoted to a Monetary policy topic in a given
speech, to 0.99, indicating that almost the entire speech covers issues
related to ECB core mandate.
Independent variable
Our argument suggests that the ECB responds to negative public opinion by
strategically expanding the issues it deals in its external communication. Our
main independent variable is thus a measure of public support. Specifically,
we measure EU citizens’ trust towards the ECB by coding the responses to
the Eurobarometer question on this issue for each semester between 2001
and 2017.12 In line with previous studies, we operationalise citizens’ net
trust as the difference between the percentage of respondents who tend to
trust and those who tend do not trust the ECB (Roth et al., 2014). In our
data, net trust ranges from −17.64 to 27.57, with an average value of 2.01.
Negative values indicate that a majority of respondents mistrust the ECB,
vice-versa for positive values. Trust significantly declined with the onset of
the sovereign debt crisis and its aftermath (see Appendix D).
Controls
As discussed in the Introduction, an alternative explanation for the changes in
ECB communication lies in the changes in the economic policy context in
which the ECB operates. To control for the influence of this argument, our
analysis control for the influence of economic growth, inflation and unem-
ployment. Data were taken from the Eurostat database on a monthly base
for unemployment and inflation (change of HICP) and on a quarterly base
for GDP volume growth. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we also run a
separate regression excluding unemployment because of its degree of colli-
nearity with public trust variables (see Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014;
Foster & Frieden, 2017; Roth et al., 2014). As a further control for the economic
situation, we employ a newspaper-based measure of economic policy uncer-
tainty (EPU) that foreshadow declines in investment, output, and employment
(Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2016).
Since a more diverse communication could reflect the transformations in
the ECB policies and legal role including in the area of financial stability and
economic adjustment, we use a number of controls to investigate this
counter-claim. In particular, we use the ECB balance-sheet liabilities as a
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proxy of the expansion of ECB (unconventional) policy interventions that
could justify a broadening of its communication.13 We also include a
dummy variable that takes the value of one after July 2012, that is after the
decision by European heads of government to create the Banking Union
that has expanded the ECB mandate.
We also control for the characteristics of the audiences that central bankers
address in their communication. Specifically, we classified each speech in
three categories according to their target audience: political speeches, includ-
ing hearings and testimonies before the European Parliament and national
parliaments; press speeches, including press conferences and interviews to
newspapers and magazines; and general speeches, including all the remain-
ing speeches delivered, among the others, before societal actors and business
associations.
Finally, we control for some characteristics related to the individual ECB
policymakers, as their institutional duties and terms of office may be expected
to influence communication. In particular, we distinguish between speakers’
role by including a dummy variable coded one if the speaker is the President
of the ECB and zero otherwise. We also control for the influence of the terms
of office of each ECB policymakers by counting the number of days that are
left to the end of the mandate when each speech is delivered. Lastly, to
control for the longitudinal structure of the data, a year-counter variable is
added to the model.
Results
We perform our analysis using a multilevel model to account for the hierarch-
ical nature of the data (i.e., speeches are clustered across different speakers).14
Table 1 presents the regression results of our analysis. The dependent variable
in Model 1 and 2 is issue diversity; while the dependent variable in Model 3 is
core salience. Models 1 and 2 differ in the inclusion of the unemployment vari-
able to address the multicollinearity problems discussed above, even if the
results are consonant in both models.15 In our discussion below, however,
we prioritise results from Model 2 because it shows the best goodness of
fits with the data (as confirmed by both the Akaike and Bayesian information
criteria [AIC and BIC]).
Our analysis reveals that public opinion attitudes are a statistically signifi-
cant predictor of the diversity of issues covered in Executive Board
members’ communication. Specifically, an increase in public trust significantly
decreases the level of issue diversity in ECB speeches. The salience assigned to
issues related to the ECB core mandate is also influenced by public opinion
attitudes: the results indicate that an increase in public trust significantly
increases core salience. That is to say, ECB policymakers tend narrowing
their attention to a few issues when public contestation is low and,
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consequently, expanding issue diversity when the ECB confronts higher levels
of public contestation.
Substantively, moving from one standard deviation below the mean
(roughly the average value of trust registered after 2010) to one standard devi-
ation above the mean (the average value registered before 2010) results in a
reduction of about one unit in the number of topics in ECB communication.
The same shift in public trust increases the salience of core mandate-related
topics by about ten percentage points. This is equivalent to say that, on
average, issue diversity has increased by about 30 percent in relative terms
before and after 2010, while core salience has decreased by the same figure.
Table 1. Determinants of issue diversity and core salience in ECB speeches.
Dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Issue diversity Core salience




Political Audience 0.461* 0.462* −0.002
(0.182) (0.183) (0.031)




President −0.377* −0.377* 0.211***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.051)
Time to end mandate −0.010+ −0.010* −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Economic Growth (GDP) −0.061+ −0.059 0.013***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.003)
Inflation 0.065 0.067 −0.034***
(0.081) (0.079) (0.09)
Unemployment −0.019 _ _
(0.068)
Uncertainty −0.002** −0.002** −0.0000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0000)
Time −0.023 −0.021 0.005
(0.050) (0.046) (0.008)
Liabilities 0.043 0.050 0.010
(0.156) 0.165 0.025
ECB Mandate −0.073 −0.074 −0.058
(0.185) (0.187) (0.038)
Constant 5.856*** 5.617*** 0.347***
(1.059) (0.403) (0.085)
SD (speaker) 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.094***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.019)
SD (residual) 2.003*** 2.003*** 0.284***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.023)
N 1427 1427 1427
N speaker 17 17 17
AIC 6082.1 6080.2 525.8
BIC 6161.1 6153.8 599.5
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance:+p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
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To further assess the substantive magnitude of the findings, we use again
STM to plot the relationship between net trust in the ECB and topic prevalence
of the seven macro-areas of ECB communication identified above (Figure 3).
STM allows testing the correlation patterns of public trust with topic preva-
lence in a regression-like framework.
Figure 3 shows an overall positive and strong correlation between public
trust and the prevalence of most of the topics that pertain to Monetary
policy. This result provides further support to the evidence reported above
by showing that, in line with our theoretical expectations, ECB members
tend to focus their public stance on price stability-related issues when net
public trust is high – but not vice versa.
It is important to note, however, there is one relevant exception to this
trend: Topic 18 shows a positive trend when public trust in the ECB decreases.
As discussed above, this topic captures talk about unconventional monetary
policy. While it is not straightforward to interpret this result, the positive
relationship between public distrust and talk on unconventional policy may
indicate that ECB policymakers felt the need to provide information on
their unconventional actions given the lack of policy precedent and the wide-
spread criticisms leveled by experts and elected policymakers levels. In
general, however, the results reported in Figure 3 show that ECB policymakers
Figure 3. Topic prevalence in ECB communication and public trust in the ECB. Notes:
Topics are ordered based on their average prevalence. Red horizontal lines refer to
the average topic prevalence over the period of analysis (2001–2017). 95 percent confi-
dence intervals are reported.
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select the issues to include in their communication with great care when con-
fronting a negative public opinion – including which issues within the mon-
etary policy category.
In addition to the public opinion effect, Table 1 shows that speaking before
political audiences predicts the level of issue diversity but not the salience
attributed to monetary policy-related issues. This result is broadly in line
with the observation that the format of the exchanges between the ECB
and political audiences favor the expansion of the scope of attention. For
instance, for the speeches delivered in context of the Monetary Dialogue,
which constitute about 75 per cent in the political audience category, it is
common practice that the ECB President incorporates into her introductory
statement the topics selected by MEPs in advance to the meeting as deser-
ving particular attention. The lack of a significant effect in the speeches
before the press might be read in light of the fact that these categories of
speeches include the press conferences that the ECB President regularly deli-
vers following the meetings of the Governing Council where monetary
decisions are taken. Since press conferences are primarily directed at provid-
ing information on the monetary policy decision just adopted, it may be the
case that the ECB President tries to minimise the ‘noise’ in the policy message
by narrowing it on a limited number of issues.
Some of the individual characteristics of ECB policymakers also have an
impact on the ECB communicative strategies. In particular, we find that ECB
Presidents are less likely to expand the scope of their communication while
devoting more salience to price stability issues as compared to other Execu-
tive Board members. This finding suggests that, as the highest official in the
institution, ECB Presidents tends to project the ECB organisational image
and thus tend focussing on the core mandate of the institution. The results
on the effect of the term of office is mild on issue coverage and non-signifi-
cant for the salience attributed to monetary policy. It should also be noted
that neither the dummy on the ECB mandate nor the control variable for
ECB policies significantly impact our dependent variables.
In contrast, both economic growth and inflation significantly affect the sal-
ience on monetary policy, although in different directions. Indeed, a positive
variation of the GDP leads to a significant expansion of the relevance of the
issues related to the ECB core mandate, while higher levels of inflation
reduces it (Model 3). While it is not straightforward to interpret this effect,
one way to think about this result is that the emphasis attributed to monetary
policy issues when the macroeconomic outlook is positive reveals the ECB
‘anti-inflationary bias’ – that is to say, the ECB tends to be more reactive to
the inflationary risks that may stem from a growing economy than to defla-
tionary risks in light of its German-inspired hawkish approach to monetary
policy (Howarth & Loedel, 2003, p. 52). It should also be noted that economic
uncertainty exerts a negative effect on the diversity of issues covered in ECB
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communication. This finding connects with the conclusion reached in monet-
ary policy circles that ‘a central bank should perhaps be wary of communicat-
ing about issues on which it receives noisy signals itself – such as the evolution
of the economy’ (Blinder et al., 2008).
Conclusions
In recent years, a growing number of EU citizens have lost trust in EU insti-
tutions and EU integration process at large. Although important differences
exist among member countries, the emergence of what Hooghe and Marks
(2009, p. 7) have called the ‘constraining dissensus’ in the European public
sphere has posed new challenges for EU institutions. Nowhere are these chal-
lenges as evident as it is the case for the ECB. Indeed, the ECB is one of the EU
institutions that has suffered the most from the growing dissatisfaction of EU
citizens. Furthermore, this dissatisfaction is not entirely new for the ECB. Since
its creation, the ECB has faced accusations of eschewing democratic legiti-
macy behind the veil of its independence.
The contribution of this article has been to examine how the ECB responds
to public dissatisfaction and what this response tells us about the sources of
ECB legitimacy. In particular, we examined the impact of public opinion on
how the ECB crafts its policy message in order to shed light on whether the
selected communicative strategy is geared at giving pride of place to the
achievement of its mandate. After controlling for economic conditions and
changes to the ECB mandate following the sovereign debt crisis, our
findings show that negative public opinion pushes the ECB to expand the
scope of its policy message rather than narrowing it on issues related to its
core mandate.
Our findings provide some nuances to the debate on the ECB accountabil-
ity framework by showing that the ECB listens to the public. More precisely,
the ECB adapts the way in which it delivers its message when it confronts
public contestation. While ECB response falls short of the full-fledged demo-
cratic control mechanisms that several ECB critics have called for (Transpar-
ency International, 2017), it nonetheless helps recast the debate on the ECB
legitimacy framework by bringing back into the picture the ECB relationship
with the public in addition to the one with the European Parliament. Our
findings also to point to an unusual strategy to respond to public contestation
for an institution that has traditionally signaled to rely on policy output as a
justification for its independence and accountability.
In spite of these contributions, however, our analysis faces a number of
limitations. For instance, a more detailed assessment of the extent to which
the ECB seeks legitimacy by expanding communication would require a
more refined analysis of the match between societal concerns and the
topics covered in ECB policymakers’ communication. This analysis would
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also allow assessing to what policy issues and national audiences the ECB is
more attentive to. Still, a more fine-grained content analysis of ECB communi-
cation would allow assessing whether the ECB legitimation strategy is also
informed by a blame-shifting logic. That is to say, by expanding its communi-
cation beyond monetary issues, the logic behind the ECB legitimation strategy
might have been that of signaling to the public that the solutions to economic
and societal problems lie not in central banks’ hands. While future research
will shed light on these important issues, our analysis provides the building
blocks for this research agenda by shedding light on the importance of
public trust for the ECB and showing the potential of applying automated
content methods to further explore this relationship.
Notes
1. Financial Times, Anti-capitalist protesters target ECB in Frankfurt, March 18, 2015;
Financial Times, ECB adjusts to life amid the protests, April 23, 2015.
2. Benoit Coeuré, ECB Executive Board Member, as reported in The Financial Times,
ECB hits the road to pitch its policies, 8 October 2018.
3. We also investigated whether reverse causality exists between public support
and communication expansion. Our empirical tests (Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri,
2011) suggest that the presence of reverse causation does not undermine our
conclusions (see Appendix A).
4. For instance, as compared to other major central banks in the advanced econ-
omies, the ECB has not published account of monetary policy meetings until
2015 and these accounts do not provide information on the individual prefer-
ences of ECB policymakers.
5. Our analysis starts in 2001 in order to discount potential problems related to
data availability and public awareness of ECB activity that might have been
limited in the first years of its operations.
6. All speeches were automatically retrieved from the Bank for International Settle-
ments website. The speeches of Sirkka Hämäläinen (1998–2003) and Eugenio
Solans (1998–2004) were not available.
7. Information is regularly provided also through research publications and, since
2015, through the publication of the accounts of monetary policy meetings.
8. More than 80 per cent of the speeches in our corpus are not part of the ECB legal
and operational obligations such hearings and press conferences.
9. We estimate topic models using the stm package in R (Roberts, Stewart, &
Tingley, 2018).
10. We aggregated topics to help the reader to better visualise the results of the
topic model analysis. The only relevant macro-category for the purpose of the
statistical analysis is the one on monetary policy, which we discuss in what
follows.
11. Measures of issue or attention diversity have been extensively used in several
studies related to public policy, agenda formation and party competition (see
Greene, 2016).
12. Respondents were asked to choose among three categories: “Tend to trust it”,
“Tend not to trust it” and “Do not know”. For each year, data were taken from
the Eurobarometer of May and October. Data on net trust in the ECB were
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matched to the speeches according to the date of the document. Population-
weighted trust values are employed. We also compute a measure of net trust
limited to Eurozone countries. The results show that there is no significant differ-
ence between the impact of the former compared to net trust at the European
level (see Appendix E). Given the role played by the ECB also in non-eurozone
countries, we thus used data on EU trust. We also included two variables measur-
ing the difference between net trust toward the ECB and net trust toward the EU
Parliament and the EU Commission. We found that only trust in the ECB is sig-
nificant for ECB communication (data are available upon request).
13. Data are taken from the annual consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem at
the end of each month.
14. We run the analysis using different model specifications: a speaker-level fixed
effects; random intercepts for speaker and time; a random slope for time-
counter between speakers; a model including all the ECB representatives who
delivered at least ten speeches; and, finally, a model including only observations
starting from 2002 (the year of Euro introduction). The results are similar to those
reported. Data are available upon request.
15. Both unemployment and public trust show a very high variance inflation factor,
indicating that knowing the former is possible to predict the latter quite well.
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